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UNVEILING THE MEANING OF SOCIAL JUSTICE
IN COLOMBIA 
Carlos Andrés PÉREZ-GARZÓN* 
ABSTRACT: Through the presentation of  the history of  social justice in global 
constitutional discourse, this article aims to demonstrate that, although in Co-
lombia there is not a constitutionalized purpose or principle of social justice, as 
in other countries, the modern notion of  distributive justice, also called social 
justice today, is implicit in the Constitution of  1991 because it enshrined as 
mandatory rules the three main elements of  its meaning at the time of  its prom-
ulgation: the principle of  social rule of  law, the principle of  human dignity and 
the right to a material equality. Thus, in Colombia social justice must not be 
understood in the Aristotelian sense of  distributive justice but in accordance with 
these three elements, and can only be achieved if  they are fulfilled. 
KEY WORDS: Distributive justice, social justice, human dignity, merit, mate-
rial equality, affirmative actions 
RESUMEN: Mediante la presentación de la historia de la justicia social en el 
discurso constitucional global, este artículo pretende demostrar que, a pesar de 
no existir en Colombia, como en otros países, un valor o principio constitucional 
de justicia social, la noción moderna de justicia distributiva, también llamada 
hoy justicia social, se encuentra implícita en la Constitución de 1991 porque 
esta consagró como normas obligatorias los tres elementos principales de su 
significado en el tiempo en el que fue promulgada: el principio de Estado Social 
de Derecho, el principio de dignidad humana y el derecho a una igualdad mate-
rial. Así pues, la justicia social debe entenderse en Colombia a partir de esos tres 
elementos, no según el sentido aristotélico de justicia distributiva, y sólo puede 
ser alcanzada si ellos se cumplen. 
PALABRAS CLAVE: Justicia distributiva, justicia social, dignidad humana, 
merecimiento, igualdad material, acciones afirmativas 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Defining distributive justice is not an easy issue. In fact, if someone wants to 
write about it, it is very important to establish first what will be understood 
by it, which author or school of  thought will be followed, etc., in order to
make clear to the reader what the writer means by this concept. Accord-
ing to Samuel Fleischacker1 distributive justice has been understood in two 
senses throughout the history of  the tradition of  political philosophy based 
on ancient Greek thought: the Aristotelian and the modern sense. In general 
terms, the first one refers to giving everyone what they deserve according to 
their merits and the telos or purpose of  the thing to be allocated,2 while the 
second one, the object of  this research article and also called “social justice” 
today,3 refers to a duty of  the State to guarantee everyone in society a certain 
level of  means to satisfy their needs.4 
On November 26, 2007, the United Nations (UN) established World Social 
Justice Day, to be celebrated on February 20 each year.5 By doing so, the UN
1 SAMUEL FLEISCHACKER, A Short History of Distributive Justice (Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 2012) [FLEISCHACKER, “A SHORT”]. 
2 Id. at 5. 
3 However, it is worth noting that there is no consensus about how social justice should be 
understood, what its origin is, and how it came to be synonymous to distributive justice; those 
issues will be conducted in this paper. 
4 FLEISCHACKER, A Short, supra note 2 at 4. 
5 G.A. Res. 62/10, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/10 (Nov. 26, 2007). 
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placed social justice as one of  the most important issues that it has to promote 
in order to achieve its original purpose of  preserving peace and security in 
the world. Certainly, social justice is an omnipresent and controversial issue 
both in politics and the law today. In politics, for example, the highest chief 
of FARC-EP guerrilla, Rodrigo Londoño, alias Timochenko, after hearing of 
President Juan Manuel Santos’ nomination to the Peace Nobel Prize, said 
that the only prize his guerrilla wanted was peace with social justice.6 Now, in 
the legal arena, there are nearly seventy constitutions around the world that 
enshrine the expression “social justice” —despite the different cultures and 
backgrounds— as a purpose or principle of  the State itself.7 
In Colombia, even though the Political Constitution of  1991 doesn’t ex-
plicitly enshrine the expressions “social justice” or “distributive Justice” as a 
purpose or principle of the State, it should be stressed that the Constitutional 
Court, its main and ultimate interpreter and a world-renowned institution 
because of  its active protection of  social rights in the last two decades, has ap-
plied those expressions in its judgments since its foundation in 1992. Actually, 
in a very famous judgment in 1992, the Court mentions social or distributive 
justice as a matter of  allocation of  means with the aim of  guaranteeing social 
rights in the new Social Rule of  Law.8 Nevertheless, the judgment also in-
6 El Espectador, El único premio al que aspiramos es el de la paz con justicia social: Timochenko, (Oct. 
7, 2016), https://goo.gl/G2zqiM. Despite the historical evolution of  the expression, it is still 
paradoxical that, following the example above, a Marxist guerrilla uses that expression to
describe the goal of  its “revolutionary plan”, although the term has strong roots in the social
discourse of  the Catholic Church. 
7 Countries whose current constitutions enshrine the expression “distributive justice”: Phil-
ippines, 1987. Countries whose current constitutions enshrine the expression “social justice”: 
Afghanistan, 2004; Albania, 1998; Algeria, 1989; Angola, 2010; Antigua and Bermuda, 1981; 
Argentina, 1853; Armenia, 1995; Bahrain, 2002; Bangladesh, 1972; Belize, 1981; Bhutan, 
2008; Bolivia, 2009; Brazil, 1998; Burundi, 2005; Costa Rica, 1949; Croatia, 1991; Cuba 
1976; Dominica, 1978; Dominican Republic, 2015; Ecuador, 2008; Egypt, 2014; El Salva-
dor, 1983; Equatorial Guinea, 1991; Eritrea, 1997; Gabon, 1991; Guatemala, 1985; Guin-
ea-Bissau, 1984; Guyana, 1980; Honduras, 1982; India, 1949; Indonesia, 1945; Iraq, 2005; 
Ireland, 1937; Jordan, 1952; Kenya, 2010; Kosovo, 2008; Kuwait, 1962; Kyrgyzstan, 2010; 
Lebanon, 1926; Liberia, 1986; Macedonia, 1991; Montenegro, 2007; Morocco, 2011; Mo-
zambique, 2004; Nepal, 2015; Niger, 2010; Nigeria, 1999; Pakistan, 1973; Panama, 1972; 
Paraguay, 1992; Philippines, 1987; Poland, 1997; Portugal, 1976; Qatar, 2003; Rwanda, 2003; 
Saint Lucia, 1978; Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 1979; Sao Tome and Principe, 1975; 
Serbia, 2006; Sierra Leone, 1991; Solomon Islands, 1978; Somalia, 2012; South Africa, 1996; 
South Sudan, 2011; Sudan, 2005; Suriname, 1987; Syrian Arab Republic, 2012; Timor-Leste, 
2002; Trinidad and Tobago, 1976; Tunisia, 2014; Turkey, 1982; Uganda, 1995; United Arab 
Emirates, 1971; United Republic of Tanzania, 1977; Uzbekistan, 1992; Venezuela, 1999; and 
Zimbabwe, 2013. Notice that the enactment date does not always correspond to the year in 
which the expression was added into the Constitution, for example, by an amendment. See 
Constitute, https://goo.gl/9YFqxR 
8 Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Judgment T-406 of  1992. As Fleis-
chacker would have said, the Court applied the modern sense of  distributive justice. 
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cludes a corrective function in the sense that distributive justice also allocates 
punishments, which, as will be explained later below, is against the principles 
of  Social Rule of  Law and human dignity, and the right to material equality, 
enshrined by the Constitution.9 
It is important to point out not so much why the Court has applied an 
old-fashioned and unconstitutional notion of  distributive justice,10 but that, 
even though there is no mandatory rule in the Constitution that enshrines 
social or distributive justice as a purpose or principle of  the state, the Court 
has continuously described it as a purpose of  the state itself  in its judgments 
since 1992.11 At least three questions arise from this fact: Is it permissible for 
a Court, the Congress or the executive to appeal to an extra-systemic pur-
pose or principle when drafting, for example, a judgment, an act, a decree, 
etc.? Is social justice just an expression that Colombian legal practitioners, 
judges, and legal scholars should not take into account? And, can it be freely 
interpreted and applied both in the Aristotelian and a modern sense without 
contradicting the Constitution? 
In this article, i will try to support the argument that, even though it is not 
a purpose or principle enshrined by the Constitution, the modern notion of 
distributive justice or “social justice,”12 and not the ancient one, is an implicit 
idea in the Constitution, because the latter enshrined the three main elements 
of  such a modern notion, i.e., the principles of  Social Rule of  Law and hu-
man dignity, and the right to material equality, which were available in the 
global constitutional discourse of the years in which the Constitution was 
promulgated.13 So, the expressions “social justice” or “distributive justice” 
can be used in the national constitutional discourse,14 but by following the 
9 Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Judgment C-171 of  1993. 
10 Changes in the definition of a very ambiguous expression through the years are justifi-
able because of  the nature of  a collegiate body. 
11 Although hundreds of  them can be found, see, e.g., some current uses of  the expres-
sion “distributive justice” in this sense: Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], 
Judgment T-014 of  2016; Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Judgment 
C-027 of  2016; and some uses of  the expression “social justice” throughout two decades in 
this sense too: Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Judgment T-476 of  1998; 
Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Judgment T-177 of  1999; Corte Consti-
tucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Judgment C-063 of  2008; Corte Constitucional [C.C.] 
[Constitutional Court], Judgment T-891 of  2013; Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional 
Court], Judgment T-395 of  2016. 
12 The author follows the current tendency of  equating the meaning of  these expressions. 
13 Now, by constitutional discourse, the author means a system of  thoughts, beliefs, and 
knowledge about the constitutional law that are shared by the agents of the constitutional field, 
i.e., judges, practitioners, and legal scholars, a system that also includes the rules that make up 
the constitutional law itself, e.g., the constitution, the ratio decidendi of  certain judgments on the 
constitutionality of  a rule, etc. Comp. MICHAEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE
(New York: Pantheon, 1972). 
14 For example, in a judgment or even in an amendment to the Constitution, but also in an 
act, decree, a scholarly paper or a book, and so on. 
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principles and the right above, i.e., it ought to be understood, at least, as a 
duty of  the state to guarantee a certain minimum means, based on human 
dignity and a different treatment in benefit of the poorest, discriminated, 
vulnerable, and marginalized people in society. Finally, the proposed meaning 
can be proved by the fact that, if  the ancient or Aristotelian interpretation of 
distributive or social justice is followed in the constitutional discourse, e.g., in 
a judgment, it would disregard, even violate, the two principles and the right 
mentioned above. 
So, the general objective of  this article is to demonstrate that, even though
there is no purpose or principle of  social justice in the Colombian Constitu-
tion of  1991, social justice is implicit in it and can be achieved by guarantee-
ing the principles of  Social Rule of  Law and human dignity, and the right to
material equality. The first specific purpose —although without exhaustive
pretensions— is to contribute to clarify the meaning of  the expression “so-
cial justice” today in the global constitutional discourse, by presenting new
evidence about its origin, historical evolution, and relation with the prin-
ciples of  Social Rule of  Law and human dignity, and the right to material
equality, which are, in fact, the three legal tools of  the State to materialize
social justice. The second purpose is to show that, by enshrining the two
principles and the right mentioned above, social justice has become implicit
in the Constitution of  1991 and can be used in the Colombian constitutional
discourse if  it is only understood according to those rules and not to the
Aristotelian sense of distributive justice. Finally, the third specific objective
is to prove that the achievement of  social justice in the Colombian State is
possible and requires, essentially, the fulfillment of the principles of Social
Rule of  Law and human dignity, and the right to material equality, which
are mandatory rules to the branches of  power and the civil society. So, the
justification for this research article is evident, because the clarification of 
that expression can guide the agents of the legal field, mainly in Colombia,
but also in the world, on how to understand social justice in order to have the
tools to materialize it through Law.15 
Now, in the first part, by following the methodology proposed by the So-
cio-cultural and Transnational School of  Legal History, which states that a le-
gal institution (e.g., the Social Rule of  Law, human dignity, material equality, 
distributive justice or social justice, etc.) should be contextualized according 
to “its preconditions and effects on a concrete society and culture, under a 
Although arguably, for the author social justice cannot be achieved if  nobody knows 
what it is or, at least, what its essential elements are. Now, for the author, the very knowledge 
that social justice can be attained by the application of  the principles of  Social Rule of  Law 
and human dignity and the right to material equality, is a legal tool by itself  (e.g., for a judge, 
the legislator, or a policy maker), but also the especial lawsuits that protect those principles and 
right and prevent their violation, for example: lawsuits demanding to declare unconstitutional 
an act or the immediate protection of  the fundamental right. 
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transnational and comparative view,”16 an attempt will be made to construct 
a historical overview of  the evolution of  the modern notion of  distributive or 
social justice in the comparative constitutional discourse. In the second part it 
will be shown: i) that the main elements of  the modern notion of  distributive 
or social justice presented above were enshrined by the current Colombian 
Constitution in 1991, ii) how a Colombian constitutional meaning of  social 
justice would be like, iii) how the application of  an Aristotelian meaning of 
distributive or social justice in the constitutional discourse would disregard 
and even violate mandatory principles and rights, and iv) some examples on 
how distributive or social justice can be achieved by applying such a mean-
ing in the national constitutional discourse. Finally, as a summary of  the two 
parts and a reflection, a brief  conclusion will be drawn. 
II. A SHORT HISTORY OF SOCIAL JUSTICE IN GLOBAL
CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE 
1. Aristotelian Distributive Justice 
In his book Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle distinguished between two notions 
of justice: the first one called “universal justice,” which includes all the vir-
tues, and a second one called “particular justice,” which belongs to the world 
of  politics and judicial decisions. Within the latter notion, Aristotle presents 
two subtypes: corrective justice and distributive justice.17 The first one refers 
to the elimination of the benefits and losses produced by a situation of in-
equality in voluntary or involuntary interactions, in order to restore equality 
between the parties of  these interactions. This type of  justice was more com-
monly known as commutative justice, a name that derived from the Latin 
expression used by Thomas Aquinas justitia commutativa in which commutare
means “to exchange”,18 and whose use can be noticed in the judgment that is 
discussed here. The second type of particular justice says that political offices 
and property must be awarded according to merit; here, Aristotle points out: 
“all men agree that what is fair in distribution must be according to merit in 
some sense.”19 However, the understanding of  this distinction has not been 
peaceful throughout the centuries and has been permeated by the context 
from which Aristotle has been read.20 
16 BERND MARQUARDT, Historia Constitucional Comparada de Iberoamérica 22 (Bogotá: Grupo 
Editorial Ibáñez, 2016). 
17 ARISTOTLE, The nichomachean ethics 1129a1-1132b20 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009) [ARISTOTLE, N.E.]. 
18 IZHAK ENGLARD, CORRECTIVE AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: FROM ARISTOTLE TO MODERN
TIMES 7, 17 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
19 ARISTOTLE, N.E., supra note 18 at 1131a25. 
20 ALLAN BEEVER, FORGOTTEN JUSTICE: FORMS OF JUSTICE IN THE HISTORY OF LEGAL AND PO-
LITICAL THEORY 68-70 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) [BEEVER, FORGOTTEN]; FRED
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Thus, equality in corrective justice imposes a rectification of the inequal-
ity caused within a voluntary or involuntary interaction, regardless of  merit,
for example: when a judge sentences someone to pay a prison sentence for
homicide, he does not consider whether the condemned man deserves the
punishment because he was a bad man, or if  he does not deserve it because,
in spite of everything, he was a good man. Therefore, Aristotle clarifies that
“it makes no difference whether a good man has defrauded a bad man or a
bad man a good man ...the law looks only to the distinctive character of  the
injury.”21 
In distributive justice, equality is achieved through the sharing of  com-
mon assets (e.g, property or political positions) available in a society ruled by
the same constitution, according to the merit of  the person to whom such
assets will be awarded. Justice requires that those assets be proportional to
the merit of  the individual to whom they are to be awarded. For this reason,
it is unfair to treat the “unequal in merit” as “equal in merit,” giving them
equal assets.22 
If  merit is the basis for doing such a distribution, then: what is merit? Ar-
istotle does not give a definition of merit. In fact, he notes that people may 
disagree on the meaning of  merit in distributive justice and does not take 
sides in the debate expressly.23 Nevertheless, it can be said that, in general, 
merit constitutes a measure of the accomplishment of certain requirements 
that make a person be a part in distributive justice.24 
Aristotle argues that the concept of  merit depends on the type of  politi-
cal regime that a community has. Thus, in an oligarchy, wealthy or noble 
birth are the basis to make the distribution of the benefits: whoever had more 
wealth and a better rank deserved to receive a better public office than the 
one that did not have them at all; in an aristocracy, aristocrats would insist on 
a distribution according to excellence; finally, in a democracy, they would say 
that distribution should be based on freedom, that is, a free citizen would have 
certain benefits that a slave would not have.25 
According to Aristotle, once the meaning of  merit has been given, it will
be possible to allocate the benefits in a political community, a distribution
that will take into account the relevant merit to the thing to be allocated.26 
For Aristotle, if there is a flute to be allocated, it should not be given to those
MILLER, Nature, justice, and rights in Aristotle’s politics 71-74 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1995). 
21 ARISTOTLE, N.E., supra note 18 at 1132a. 
22 ARISTOTLE, N.E., supra note 18 at 1131a20. 
23 ARISTOTLE, N.E., supra note 18 at 1131a25. 
24 John Hill, A Theory of  Merit, 1 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 19 (2002). 
25 ARISTOTLE, N.E., supra note 18 at 1131a25; Rosen, 1975, pp. 234-236. 
26 MICHAEL SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT’S THE RIGHT THING TO DO? 186-188 (New York: Farrar, 
Strauss and Giroux, 2010). 
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who were born in a wealthy or noble family, but to the person who can better
play the flute, because that is the person who can better fulfill the purpose
for which the flute was designed, i.e., being well played to produce the best
music.27 
In this way, a reasonable answer to the question about the meaning of 
merit for Aristotle is that it is the virtue or excellence relevant to the thing to 
be allocated (virtue or excellence understood as the ability to fulfill the telos or 
purpose of  the thing). Despite that, this answer is arguable if  it is taking into 
account that there is no consensus about the meaning of  merit for Aristotle 
because he never defined it. At least in the distribution of the flutes, the con-
clusion would seem to work, but if  hypothetically a slave or a stranger had 
more virtues with respect to a political office, would they deserve the flute? 
The answer in this case would be negative because, although excellence is the 
most important part of  the meaning of  merit in distributive justice, Aristotle 
says that political virtue (the exercised virtue in political life) cannot be ex-
ercised if it is not supported by external means. Thus, without freedom and 
wealth, a slave or stranger would not be able to hold a public office. Merit, 
in the ideal political regime for Aristotle (the aristocracy), would take into ac-
count the virtue complemented with freedom and wealth.28 
Finally, if equality in Aristotelian distributive justice is based on the pro-
portionality between the merit of  a person and the purpose or telos of  the 
thing to be adjudicated to her, then, how would the Aristotelian distributive 
justice deal with the socio-economic inequalities that are discussed by mod-
ern theories of  justice? Of course, a logical consequence of  the Aristotelian 
distributive justice is that it could only remain immobile before the claims 
of material equality: socio-economic inequalities would be justified because 
the only thing that matters to Aristotelian distributive justice is that the rule 
of distribution according to merit is not affected.29 Thus, neither the rich are 
called to share their wealth with the poor nor the State is called upon to make 
distributive policies on wealth: the rich have wealth because they have worked 
hard to obtain or preserve it (if  it has been inherited), and have been prudent 
in their investments; in addition, such inequalities would be naturally justified 
because of, e.g., the race, the education level, or wrong decisions.30 In short, 
social inequities are the product of the difference in excellence to deserve the 
means that the wealthy possess; the purpose of  distributive justice is not to 
satisfy the needs of  the poorest, vulnerable, and marginalized people of  soci-
ety, but to give each one what she deserves according to her excellence with 
respect to the thing to be allocated. 
27 ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 1282b14 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) [ARISTOTLE, P.]. 
28 DAVID KEYT, Aristotle’s theory of distributive justice, in ACOMPANION TO ARISTOTLE’S POLITICS
259 (David Keyt, & Fred Miller eds., Oxford: Blackwell, 1991). 
29 Eric Engle, Aristotle, law and justice: the tragic hero, 35 N. KY. L. REV. 1, 2, 10-12 (2008). 
30 Id. 
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2. The Evolution of  Distributive Justice as Social Justice: Three Stages 
A. First Stage of  Social Justice 
In the first stage, which extends to the beginning of the 20th century, the 
expression “social justice” was born in Europe at some point in the Old Re-
gime, and was used to refer to “the justice of  society,” that is, the justice that 
had to regulate the relations between the individuals that compose society, 
and did not denote any relation with the idea of obligatory minimum means, 
human dignity, or material equality, because, in that aristocratic and hierar-
chical society, although the concern that the poor also needed some means to 
survive was not ignored, Christian morality argued that the division between 
the rich and the poor was a natural distinction created by God, and any dona-
tion to the poor to alleviate their suffering was an issue of Christian charity 
(form caritas, Latin word for “love”) rather than justice, which was either cor-
rective or distributive in an Aristotelian sense.31 Some references to the use of 
the expression according to the context of  this period can be found in articles 
of  journals published with the mission of  spreading the spirit of  the Enlight-
enment, in which, for example, they refer to social justice as an obligation of 
the monarch,32 and in works by Catholic theologians.33 
According to Fleischacker,34 at least in Philosophy, it was not until Adam 
Smith and his book “The Wealth of  Nations” of  1776,35 that this conception 
of  the poor, as those condemned to be poor in the earth and to be hierarchi-
cally inferior and disdained by their behavior, began to change because Smith 
suggested a change of attitude towards the poor by saying that they also pos-
sessed the same intellectual capacities, virtues, and ambitions like any human 
being. By the early 1790’s, claims of  equality in aspects such as the right to 
work and education, came to constitutionalism, particularly in the Constitu-
tion of  France of  1793,36 and, although, like many others, François Babeuf 
was already talking about a natural right to an equal enjoyment of  wealth,37 
there is no evidence that the term “distributive justice” or “social justice” has 
been used in this sense. 
31 FLEISCHACKER, A SHORT, supra note 2 at 17-52. 
32 PIERRE ROUSSEAU, VIII JOURNAL ENCYCLOPÉDIQUE OU UNIVERSEL 311 (1774), available at 
https://goo.gl/azD0O3; JEAN-JACQUES TUTOT, L’ESPRIT DES JOURNAUX FRANÇOIS ET ÉTRANG-
ERS PAR UNE SOCIÉTÉ DE GENS-DE-LETTRES. DECEMBRE. 131-133 (1784), available at https://goo. 
gl/QgwBr4 
33 GIANVINCENZO BOLGENI, L’EPISCOPATO OSSIA DELLA POTESTÀ DI GOVERNAR LA CHIESA 349 
(1789), available https://goo.gl/TZR3jz 
34 FLEISCHACKER, A SHORT, supra note 2 at 62-68. 
35 ADAM SMITH, 1 AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 96 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979). 
36 Constitution de l’an I [French Constitution of  Year I], 1793. 
37 FLEISCHACKER, A SHORT, supra note 2 at 75-79. 
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Traditionally, it has been pointed out that the expression “social justice” 
was coined in the mid-nineteenth century by the Jesuit priest Luigi Taparelli 
D’Azeglio;38 however, as seen, the use of  the expression is older. For Taparelli, 
social justice is justice “between a man and another man”, which demands, as 
they are both equal in specie by God (both are equal in humanity), they must 
be equal in rights even though, concerning their individuality, they are differ-
ent by nature (e.g., some are more intelligent, others are stronger, etc.).39 Ta-
parelli says that social justice is divided between commutative and distributive
justice: the first one balances the quantity of assets to which someone has a
right in a private relation (e.g., if  someone acquires an asset, she has to pay for
it; the right must be satisfied with something equivalent), while the second one
balances the proportion in the distribution of the common good (e.g., an office
in government must be assigned to the most skilled person, not to anyone).40 
So, it is not true that Taparelli did coined the modern sense of the term “social
justice” because his definition of social justice followed the typical features of 
this stage: social justice is the “justice of  society”, which is understood in an
Aristotelian sense and, by consequence, divided between corrective (or com-
mutative, according to Tomas Aquinas) and distributive justice.41 In the same
way, in the Anglo-Saxon world, John Stuart Mill used the expression “social
and distributive justice” in his essay “Utilitarianism”; however, as Taparelli
did, that expression was understood in an Aristotelian sense.42 
However, as United Station professor Thomas Burke clarifies,43 Taparelli’s 
conception about morality in the economy equivocally transcended as Tapa-
relli’s concept of social justice and influenced the way that expression was to 
be understood later. Taparelli’s economic doctrine suggested a confrontation 
between the economic liberalism and the ideal or catholic economy, which 
is the one he prefers. In the first place, he considered that the individualism
of  the former condemned society to a permanent war (e.g., producers against
producers and buyers), leading to demands for redistribution and commu-
38 THOMAS BURKE, The origins of social justice: Taparelli D’Azeglio, 52 MODERN AGE. A QUATERLY
REVIEW, 2, 97-106 (2010) [Burke, The origins]. 
39 LUIGI TAPARELLI, SAGGIO TEORETICO DI DRITTO NATURALE APPOGGIATO SUL FATTO 144, 145 
(Livorno: Vincenzo Mansi, 2a. ed., 1979) [Taparelli, Saggio]; comp. Burke, The Origins, supra
note 39 at 101-103. 
40 TAPARELLI, Saggio, supra note 40 at 145, 146; comp. Burke, The Origins, id. 
41 Previously, in a foot page note at page 143 of his book, when he tries to define “Law”, 
Taparelly says that he prefers to use the expression “Social Law” rather than “Law” because 
the expression “social” shows the essential distinction of  Law: it is something which is between 
a man and another man or between “associated intelligences”. So, it is possible to imagine that 
the reason why Taparelli used the expression “social justice” is the same as the one for which 
he used the expression “social justice”, i.e., because justice is also a relation between a man and 
another or “between associated intelligences”. 
42 JOHN STUARTMILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 198 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008). 
43 BURKE, The origins, supra note at 105. 
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nism; second, the ideal economy was preferable because it was based on the 
presumption of  society as a community, founded on respect for the person 
and charity, and where, as an accomplishment of  the latter, the rich (not the 
State) were responsible for providing the poor with the goods they needed to 
survive. Therefore, the role of  the State was to protect the social order both 
from the cruelty of  the powerful (e.g., big industrialists) against the poor, and 
also from the communism promoted by the poor, which rose up against the 
powerful.44 Thus, in general terms, it can be said that the roots of  the mean-
ing of  social justice that eventually became globalized can be found mainly in 
the doctrines of  a conservative Catholic political sector that was against the 
individualist laissez-faire of  the capitalist Industrial Revolution and against the 
radical communist demands for a greater economic equality, especially for 
the benefit of  the poorest sectors of  society. 
B. Second Stage of  Social Justice 
This “Taparelli’s meaning” of  social justice evolved in such a way that 
it became a third way to liberalism and communism, according to which 
a qualified type of poor, workers, should have the right to some minimum 
means to be able to exercise their work without the abuse of  their ambi-
tious employers and to minimum conditions of  life to develop themselves as 
persons. Now, this is the second stage of  social justice, which extends from 
the first decade of the twentieth century to the middle of the same century 
approximately.45 There are some fundamental documents to understand this 
44 Id. at 103-106. 
45 According to Leo W. Shields, social justice was a new word for an old type of  justice, 
legal justice, which was defined by Thomas Aquinas as the justice that regulates the actions 
of  the parts of  a community towards the achievement of  the common good. So, there were 
at least two main meanings of the words “social justice” in this interregnum between the first 
two stages: the one that assimilated social justice with legal justice, i.e., named an old idea 
with new words (for example, American legal scholar Roscoe Pound used them in this sense); 
and the other one who mixed it with distributive justice and was the most widespread mean-
ing eventually. LEO W. SHIELDS, THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE TERM SOCIAL JUSTICE (1941) 
(doctoral dissertation, University of  Notre Dame). Following Shields, the author of  the present 
article argues that, with the ascent of  the “social question” in political, economic, and legal 
discourses, the expression “legal justice” was slowly replaced by a “social justice” because the 
inclusion of the adjective “social” would seem to reflect the same issues that had been pro-
posed to address the “social question”. In this sense, social justice and not the old-fashioned 
“legal justice” would denote to the readers most precisely that justice required that all parts of 
the society, because of  their interdependence, guided their actions with the aim of  achieving the
common good, not only the good of  the industrialists, for example. So, it was logical to move
into the field of distributive justice, because the achievement of that common good could only 
be possible if  the sick part of  society in that moment, the oppressed workers, shared the indus-
trialists’ profits through their distribution by the State, so that the whole society recovered its 
health and achieved the common good. 
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transit towards the transnational consolidation of social justice as “an obliga-
tion of  the State and also of  the employers, to provide some minimum means 
so that the workers can live with dignity” are:46 political scientist Westel 
Woodbury Willoughby’s book, Social Justice: A Critical Essay, which says states 
that the problem of  social justice is both “the proper distribution of  economic 
goods… and the harmonizing of  the principles of  liberty and law, of  free-
dom and coercion,” and that is the first verifiable definition of social justice 
which expressly relates it with the distribution of  assets; 47 the preamble of  the 
Constitution of the International Labor Organization in 1919 (the first es-
tablishment of  that expression in a legal document in world history);48 the en-
cyclical “Quadragesimo anno” by Pius XI (named after the forty years of  “Rerum 
novarum”),49 written by a pupil of a Taparelli’s pupil,50 in which the Catholic 
Church officially incorporates social justice into its “social doctrine”, by say-
ing that it is an institution that orders, for example, that workers’ wages must 
satisfy the needs of  their families, including education, and that they cannot 
be diminished in order to increase the wealth of  the employers, because social 
justice condemns the excessive accumulation of  individualist capitalism; and 
finally, the encyclical “Divini redemptoris” also by Pius XI,51 according to which 
social justice, from whose rules no one can escape, demands that, for society 
to function, all members of  society, endowed with the dignity of  the human 
person, must have all the means to be able to fulfill their particular social 
function, just as the parts of  an organism are interdependent and they need 
their means so that they can give life to it. In this way, the notion of  social 
justice starts to be linked to human dignity explicitly and continues its path to 
become a constitutional and international rule as explained by Samuel Moyn 
above. Also, this was the context in which the principle of  Social Rule of  Law 
was born as explained above too. 
46 It is curious that the encyclical Rerum novarum by Pope Leo XIII, which has been tradi-
tionally mentioned as the starting point of  the “Catholic Church social doctrine”, doesn’t have 
the expression “social justice”, even though it was drafted by a Taparelli’s pupil, according to 
Burke (supra note 85 at 106): Leo XIII, Rerum novarum, 1891. 
47 W. W. WILLOUGHBY, SOCIAL JUSTICE. A CRITICAL ESSAY 11 (New York: Macmillan, 1900). 
According to Leo Shields, Willoughby is an example of  the use of  “social justice” with a similar 
meaning as distributive justice. Now, for the author, a research is needed on how the expression 
“social justice” spread out throughout the world in the first stage, for example, from Europe 
to the United States of America and Latin America, and its influence, for example, in the 
beginning of  social movements, the creation of  public policy, researches in Economy, Political 
Science, etc., inspired by this expression. 
48 International Labor Organization, Constitution of  the International Labor Organiza-
tion, 1919. It is not clear on what sense of  social justice is this document based (legal or dis-
tributive justice); nevertheless, whatever it may be, both have in common the commitment to 
improve the health of  the sick part of  society in the time, the workers, in order to achieve the 
health of  the whole society, as explained above. 
49 PIUS XI, Quadragesimo Anno, 1931. 
50 BURKE, The origins, supra note 39 at 106. 
51 PIUS XI, Quadragesimo Anno, 1931. 
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In the constitutional domain, the Constitution of Ireland became the first 
one to enshrine the expression “social justice” by stating that the exercise of 
the natural right to private property “ought, in civil society, to be regulated
by the principles of  social justice”.52 The next one was the Constitution of 
Costa Rica in 1949, which, by following the typical Christian sense of  the 
term in the second stage, enshrined social justice as a principle of  social rights 
such as to have a job and a family.53 Finally, the preamble of  the Constitution 
of  India in 1949 enshrined social justice, together with economic and politi-
cal justice, as a purpose of  the State itself. Now, this is an example of  the dif-
fusion of the expression “social justice” beyond the explicit influence of the 
tradition of  Catholic thinking in constitutional law; so, further research is en-
couraged to unveil the origin of  “social justice” in the Indian Constitution.54 
Thus, as suggested before, it is necessary to make some precisions about 
two transcendental concepts in contemporary constitutional law, which, as 
seen, are linked with the arise of social justice in the world and which, eventu-
ally, would become the legal tools through which the State will try to material-
ize social justice itself: the principle of  Social Rule of  Law, and the principle 
of  human dignity. 
a. The Principle of  Social Rule of  Law 
The Social Rule of  Law is a legal institution that arose as a result of  several 
reactions against the classical legal thought of  the late eighteenth century, 
which spread to Europe, America, and other parts of the world during the 
nineteenth century and conceived the Law (and the State) as an individual-
istic system, a consequence of  a “socio-Newtonian” conception of  society.55 
Because of the deepening of the effects of the Industrial Revolution, there 
was a need to respond to phenomena such as the exploitation of  workers, 
the growth of  misery, and health problems in the cities, etc. Thus, at the end 
of the nineteenth century, the social question arises as a concern to solve 
the problems attributed to that individualist perspective of  society, which 
also ignored the interdependence among all of the components of society.56 
Then, a labor and social security legislation emerged with ideas such as social 
function of  property, among other aspects, which marked the beginning of  a 
State engaged with two purposes: the preservation of  the Rule of  Law and its 
liberal and capitalist values, as opposed to the communists’ pretensions, and, 
52 Bunreacht na hÉireann [Constitution of  Ireland], 1937, art. 43. 
53 Constitución de Costa Rica, 1949, as originally published, art. 74. 
54 Constitution of  India, 1949, preamble. 
55 BERND MARQUARDT, 4 HISTORIA MUNDIAL DEL ESTADO 25 (Bogotá: ECOE Ediciones, 
2014) [MARQUARDT, HISTORIA]. 
56 DUNCAN KENNEDY, TRES GLOBALIZACIONES DEL DERECHO Y DEL PENSAMIENTO JURÍDICO
55-68 (Bogotá: Universidad Externado de Colombia, 2015). 
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second, the establishment of  certain minimum means for people to exercise 
their rights of the first generation (i.e. civil and political rights), in order to 
prevent communist popular uprisings. 
In spite of these advances, which can be first verified in the Constitution 
of  Mexico and, later, in the Constitution of  Weimar,57 the principle of  Social 
Rule of  Law was not expressly enshrined at the constitutional level but after 
the promulgation of  the Constitution of  France in 1946,58 the Constitution
of  the State of  Bavaria of  1946,59 and the German Basic Law,60 and, in Co-
lombia, in article 1 of the Constitution that includes the progress made in
social rights by the constitutional amendment of 1936 to the former Consti-
tution.61 It is worth pointing out that the use of the expression “Social Rule 
of  Law” (Sozialstaat in German), although not used at the beginning to denote 
all the characteristics that today are attributed to the Social Rule of  Law, 
was popularized in Germany after World War I by the social democrat legal 
scholar Hermann Heller.62 However, its theoretical background may be found
in previous works by Lorenz von Stein almost a century earlier.63 By con-
trast, in the Anglo-Saxon world, there is no such a principle of  Social Rule
of  Law in the constitutional discourse, and that cannot be assimilated with
the Welfare State, a set of  economic measures undertaken by the federal
government of  the United States to overcome the Great Depression of  1929 
through the State intervention in the national economy. Summarizing, it can
be said that a Social Rule of  Law is a Rule of  Law in which social rights are en-
shrined as a complement to civil and political rights, and whose purposes are
to preserve the liberal values of  the Enlightenment revolutions and to ensure
some minimum material means for the exercise of  civil and political rights. 
b. The Principle of  Human Dignity 
The expression “dignity”, in Latin “dignitas”, was used by the Romans to 
imply the social status of  someone in life and the honor due by that status. At 
least two traditions with a different sense of human dignity can be mentioned 
57 Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [Const. Mex.], as originally pub-
lished, Diario Oficial de la Federación [D.O.], 5 de febrero de 1917 (Mex.), arts. 27, 123; Die 
Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs [Constitution of  the German Empire], 1919 (Germ. Emp.). 
58 Constitution du 27 octobre 1946, IV République [Constitution of  French 4th Republic], 
1946 (Fr.), art. 1. 
59 Verfassung des Freistaates Bayern [Constitution of  Bayern], 1946 (Bay.), art. 3. 
60 Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Constitution of  Federal Germany], 
1949 [Ger.], art. 20. 
61 Congreso de la República de Colombia [Congress of  Colombia], Acto legislativo núme-
ro 1 de 1936 [Amendment Act no. 1 of  1936]. 
62 HERMANN HELLER, ESCRITOS POLÍTICOS 283-301 (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1985). 
63 KENNETH DYSON, THE STATE TRADITION IN WESTERN EUROPE 21 (Colchester: ECPR 
Press, 2009). 
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in European philosophy: the Catholic and the Kantian. According to the for-
mer, starting from Thomas Aquinas, this expression was used as the intrinsic 
value of  something (not only the human person, at least until 1937 because 
of  the encyclical Divini Redeptoris by Pius XI)64 with respect to its place in the 
hierarchy of  God’s creation. For example, women and animals would have a 
lesser intrinsic value than a Catholic man, and even the Catholic sacraments 
would have a greater dignity.65 In the second one, starting from Immanuel 
Kant, in philosophy, dignity (Würde in German) began to be understood as 
the intrinsic value of  every human being, because they have autonomy (a 
moral law given by their own), which prevents their instrumentalization by 
no one.66 Now, two theories on the first constitutionalization of the expression 
“human dignity” can be mentioned: those of  German scholar Bernd Mar-
quardt and American scholar Samuel Moyn. 
According to Marquardt,67 the first modern constitutionalization of hu-
man dignity is found in the Bavarian Constitution of  1946,68 where it was 
mentioned as one of  the elements that did not take into account the former 
Nazi State and as an inviolable obligation of the State. In addition, Mar-
quardt says that this constitution took up the expression “dignity”, which was 
enshrined for the first time in the Weimar Constitution of 1919,69 where it 
was prescribed that economics should be governed by “the principles of  jus-
tice” (an expression that, by its time, context, and environment, does not seem 
to refer to the Aristotelian notion of distributive justice) to guarantee human 
conditions in accordance with dignity.70 Finally, Marquardt seems to suggest 
that the Fundamental Law of Federal Germany was more influential, in the 
later transnational constitutionalization of  human dignity,71 and he says that, 
with respect to the female population, the emphasis on human dignity in the 
subsequent decades was the key to gender equality, for example, in societies 
with patriarchal traditions such as the Catholic ones and those with a Napo-
leonic Civil Law tradition.72 
On the other hand, scholar Samuel Moyn has attempted to demonstrate 
that the Irish Constitution,73 by its fervently Catholic framers that wanted to 
64 PIUS XI, Divini redemptoris, 1937. 
65 MICHAEL ROSEN, DIGNITY: ITS HISTORY AND MEANING 47-54 (Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 2012). 
66 Id. at 19-31, 80. 
67 BERNDMARQUARDT, DERECHOS HUMANOS Y FUNDAMENTALES. UNA HISTORIA DEL DERECHO
137 (Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Ibáñez, 2015) [MARQUARDT, DERECHOS]. 
68 Verfassung des Freistaates Bayern [Constitution of  Bayern], 1946 (Bay.) preamble, art. 100. 
69 Die Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs [Constitution of  the German Empire], 1919 
(Germ. Emp.), art. 151. 
70 MARQUARDT, DERECHOS, supra note 68 at 137. 
71 MARQUARDT, DERECHOS, supra note 68 at 137, 138; Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland [Constitution of  Federal Germany], 1949 [Ger.], art. 1. 
72 MARQUARDT, DERECHOS, supra note 68 at 141-143. 
73 Bunreacht na hÉireann [Constitution of  Ireland], 1937, preamble. 
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follow the indications given by the papal encyclical Divini redemptoris —which 
denounced the atheistic communism—,74 was the first constitution in world 
history to proclaim the individual dignity of  the human person as a found-
ing principle of  the State. Of  course, dignity was still interpreted according 
to the context of  the Catholic doctrine of  the time, opposed, for example, to 
recognizing the total equality of  women vis-à-vis men, especially in the tradi-
tional Catholic patriarchal home.75 Moyn’s central idea is that this constitu-
tion is important because it reflects a historical fact that no current scholar 
has noticed, namely that the inclusion of  the expression “human dignity” in 
the contemporary global constitutional discourse was spread from the tradi-
tion of  Catholic thought about dignity and not from the Kantian tradition, 
as it is currently broadly believed. According to Moyn, in addition to the Irish 
one, it was enshrined later in the constitution of  the largely Catholic State of 
Bavaria,76 as in Ireland, by the influence of the Catholic thought of this peri-
od, and globalized, totally secularized, thanks to the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights,77 in which the inclusion of the expression “human dignity” 
was due, to a large extent, to the influence, on its writers, of the frequent use 
of  the expression “dignity of  the human person” by the Pope during World 
War II, and, again, not to the Kantian tradition of  dignity.78 
Nevertheless, today, the Kantian tradition is preferred when interpreting 
the expression “human dignity”. Therefore, all the current debates on justice 
deal with the best distribution scheme and it is not disputed if  all people have 
equal worth when they are taken into account to be subjects of distributive 
justice; that is to say, it is taken for granted that all people have a dignity 
that cannot be ignored and must be respected when they are to be allocated 
rights or means, an aspect that was in discussion in Aristotle’s times.79 Thus, 
egalitarians, like John Rawls,80 argue that the best distribution scheme is one 
where benefits are guaranteed to the most disadvantaged, contrary to liber-
tarians, like Robert Nozick,81 for whom there should be no distribution by the 
State because it would be against individual freedom. 
C. Third Stage of  Social Justice 
In the third stage, which extends from the mid-twentieth century to the 
present, the notion of  social justice has been expanded from the context of  la-
74 PIUS XI, Divini redemptoris, 1937. 
75 SAMUEL MOYN, The secret history of  constitutional dignity, 17 YALE H.R. & DEV. L.J., 53-60 
(2014) [Moyn, The secret]. 
76 Verfassung des Freistaates Bayern [Constitution of  Bayern], 1946 (Bay.), preamble. 
77 U.N. Universal Declaration of  Human Rights, 1948. 
78 MOYN, The secret, supra note 76 at 59. 
79 BEEVER, FORGOTTEN, supra note 21 at 66. 
80 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE. REVISED EDITION (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1999) [RAWLS, A THEORY]. 
81 ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (New York: Basic Books, 1974). 
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bor relations thanks to the evolution of affirmative actions, the international 
establishment of  a catalog of  economic, social, and cultural rights (as a duty 
of  the State to guarantee a certain level of  minimum means to allow people 
to exercise their civil and political rights signed but not ratified by the United 
States),82 and the discussion on the adoption of differential treatment to the 
benefit of  the poor in income and wealth as part of  social justice. 
The term “affirmative action,” in its modern sense, stems from the Execu-
tive Order 10925 by USA President J. F. Kennedy,83 in which all contract-
ing agencies of the government were ordered to apply affirmative action to 
ensure that both applicants and employees were treated equally regardless 
of race, creed, color, or origin (note the link between the expression “affir-
mative action” and labor). However, this expression was already somewhat 
common in the American language in the same labor relations slang (see its 
previous use in Figure 12 below). This understanding of affirmative action 
as an instrument to fight discrimination and achieve equality of opportuni-
ties allowed the expression to be applied to measures with the same purpose 
taken, in addition to the government, by the Supreme Court of  the United 
States, for example, in the case “Regents of  the University of  California v. 
Bakke,”84 that allowed universities to include race as an admission criterion in 
order to achieve greater diversity, and, indirectly, to provide more opportuni-
ties to groups traditionally discriminated, in line with the precedent of  the 
case “Brown v. Board of  Education of  Topeka.”85 
In this period of increasing affirmative action in government and the judi-
ciary in the United States and then in the rest of  the world, John Rawls’ very 
influential book in philosophy, Law, politics, and economics, “A Theory of 
Justice”, was published in 1971 and revised throughout his life. In this work 
the expression “social justice” is used to refer to the very notion of  distributive 
justice that he uses there,86 and whose core is the principle of difference, ac-
cording to which socio-economic inequalities in an ideal well-ordered society 
are justified if they work for the benefit of the least advantaged in society, 
which are not women, the elderly, nor the traditionally marginalized people, 
among others, but those who, although sharing with other people equal liber-
ties and opportunities (the first principle of justice and the first part of the 
second principle), have less income and wealth, i.e., the poor.87 So, it is im-
portant to clarify that Rawls’ social justice did not include as one of  its main 
aims to overcome the discrimination and marginality present in the non-ideal 
sphere of  the theory, that is, in the real context of  the American society and 
82 G.A. Res.2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/21/2200 (Dec. 19, 1966). 
83 J. F. KENNEDY, Executive Order 10925, (1961), available at, https://goo.gl/p38Hqc. 
84 Regents of  Univ. of  Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
85 BROWN v. Board of  Education of  Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
86 RAWLS, A THEORY, supra note 81 at 177. 
87 JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 65 (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2001) [RAWLS, JUSTICE]; SAMUEL FREEMAN, RAWLS 106-108 (New York: Routledge, 2007). 
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other liberal societies of the time, as the promoters of affirmative action had 
actually in mind.88 
Most contemporary constitutions that enshrined the expression “social jus-
tice” as a purpose or principle of  the State did it in this stage, i.e., from the 
seventies to the second decade of  this century.89 So, even though social justice, 
as a third path between communism and laissez faire capitalism, arrived into 
the contemporary global constitutional discourse from the Catholic thought 
just like human dignity, the Christian heritage is not evident at all in the third 
stage, which has also favored the expansion of  the expression in contempo-
rary constitutional discourse throughout the world. Today, social justice is not 
only used in the labor discourse, but also in the field of affirmative actions 
for the discriminated, the vulnerable, and the marginalized. In the discourses 
that promote the achievement of social, economic, and cultural rights, and 
in those discourses that encourage a differential treatment by the State to
benefit those with lower income and wealth. These last features make up the
contemporary notion of  material equality (as opposed to formal equality). 
Summarizing, these are the three basic elements which constitute the cur-
rent meaning of  social or distributive justice in contemporary comparative 
constitutional discourse: i) the Social Rule of  Law as a duty of  a new kind of 
State, which must guarantee or allocate some minimum means so that people 
can subsist, ii) the acknowledgment of  the human dignity of  people, and iii) 
the duty to promote affirmative actions in order to guarantee the poor, the 
marginalized, the discriminated, and the vulnerable, an equal opportunity 
to develop their life plan, i.e., the warranty of  the right to material equality. 
Just like the principles of  social rule of  law and human dignity, it is neces-
sary to clarify the meaning of  “material equality” as a right, which is also a 
transcendent element both in the configuration of the current understanding 
of  social justice and in contemporary constitutional discourse. 
a. The Right to Material Equality 
In contemporary constitutional discourse, the expression “material equal-
ity” has been generally understood as a duty of the State to promote affir-
mative actions, so that equality remains not merely formal as it was before 
the enshrinement of  the socio-economic-cultural rights, in order to overcome 
socio-economic inequalities to benefit the poorest in income and wealth, but 
also the traditionally discriminated and marginalized sectors of  society.90 
Although there is no certainty about the first use of the expression “material
equality” in the global constitutional discourse, some early sources and similar
88 THOMAS NAGEL, John Rawls and affirmative action, 39, The Journal of Black in Higher Education
82 (2003). 
89 Supra note 8. 
90 EDUARDO CIFUENTES, La igualdad en la jurisprudencia de la Corte Constitucional, 7 PENSAMIENTO
JURÍDICO 65, 66 (1996). 
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in meaning like the described in the previous paragraph can be found both in
France and in Germany at the end of  the nineteenth century.91 The modern
use of this expression in English can be verified in the Austrian economist
Friedrich A. Hayek’s book “Road to Serfdom” in 1944;92 of  course, he uses it in
a context of  criticism towards centralized or collectivistic economic planning.93 
Nevertheless, just like the principle of  Social Rule of  Law, the expression 
“right to material equality” is not present in the Anglo-Saxon constitutional 
discourse and, actually, its conceptualization and use are part of  the Euro-
pean and Latin American civil law tradition. Of course, this doesn’t mean 
that, in the Anglo-Saxon constitutional discourse, there are no ways to real-
ize the purposes that the right to material equality has in other parts of  the 
world.94 That is why, in Latin America, the constant use of  the expression can 
be verified, for example by the Colombian Constitutional Court since 1992.95 
In fact, it is also used interchangeably with others just like “real and effective 
equality” (as it appears in Article 13 of  the Colombian Constitution) or “sub-
stantial equality”.96 Also in Latin America, the first constitution worldwide 
that enshrined the right to material equality as opposed to formal equality 
was the Constitution of  Ecuador in 2008.97 
However, no conclusive proof  can be given about the original source of 
inspiration for the modern use of  this expression. So, it would be interesting 
to continue looking for the primary sources of  its inspiration to determine 
when they began to be used to mean a different right to that of formal equal-
ity before the law; nevertheless, this is beyond the scope of  this research. 
D. Social Justice in Google Ngram Viewer 
Some graphs can be shown to illustrate the tendency of  the use of  the 
expression “social justice” thanks to Google Ngram Viewer, a novel tech-
nological tool for research in social sciences, which displays an approximate 
evolution of  the frequency in the use of  a word over time in several books in 
different languages.98 It can be seen that the use of  the term “social justice” is 
91 GERMER BAILLIÉRE, REVUE SCIENTIFIQUE 364 (1885), available at, https://goo.gl/0m9aPS; 
ARTHUR MÜLBERGER, P. J. PROUDHON: LEBEN UND WERKE 77 (1899). 
92 FRIEDRICH HAYEK, CAMINO DE SERVIDUMBRE 113 (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2007). 
93 See, e.g., Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Judgment T-406 of  1992. 
94 See, e.g., Encarna Carmona, El principio de igualdad material en la Constitución Europea, 
REVISTA DEL FORO CONSTITUCIONAL IBEROAMERICANO, 8, 1 (2004). 
95 See, e.g., Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Judgment T-406 of  1992. 
96 Constitución Política de Colombia [Const.], as amended, Diario Oficial [D.O.], July 20, 
1991 (Col.), art. 13. 
97 Constitución de Ecuador, as amended, 2008, art. 66 No. 4. 
98 Google Ngram Viewer will be used in this article to complement the historical narra-
tive presented here, by inquiring into the tendency of  the usage of  some expressions (material 
equality, social justice, distributive justice, and affirmative actions) in a comparative spectrum. 
It is not, of  course, the main nor ultimate source on which such a narrative is based. 
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older in French (Figure 1) and Italian (Figure 2) than, for example, in Spanish 
(Figure 3), English (Figure 4), and German (Figure 5). 
FIGURE 1 
SOURCE: https://books.google.com/ngrams 
FIGURE 2 
SOURCE: https://books.google.com/ngrams 
FIGURE 3 
SOURCE: https://books.google.com/ngrams 
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FIGURE 4 
SOURCE: https://books.google.com/ngrams 
FIGURE 5 
SOURCE: https://books.google.com/ngrams 
In all these languages, the use of this term increased in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, i.e. at the beginning of  the second stage of  its 
evolution, and, despite valleys that could be due to reasons of different nature, 
which are not pertinent to discuss here, it is important to note that it shows 
that its use grows after World War II, when the notion of  social justice of the
second stage is consolidated, arriving at its highest peak in the 1980’s, when
social justice was strengthened by the ascent, first in the United States, and
since the 1970’s in the rest of the world, of the discourses of affirmative actions
(with its ideals of  non-discrimination), equal opportunities, and distribution of 
wealth and income for the poor or disadvantaged. However, it still remains to
be known why its use has a moderate downward trend in Spanish and Italian,
and not in English or French, its use has a moderate downward trend. 
On the other hand, it can be seen how the notion of  social justice did 
not echo so much in Russian, the majority language in the main communist 
country in the twentieth century, the Union of  Soviet Socialist Republics, and 
that is because the notion was typically used in those legal-political discourses 
that stood against Communism (Figure 8). However, as a way to set up here 
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a debate that can be developed later, there is a timid rise of  the expression 
during the 20’s and 40’s, which coincides with the emergence of  important 
documents in other parts of Europe, which contain the expression “social 
justice” as described above. Moreover, it is noteworthy to mention that only 
after the collapse of  the USSR and its opening to the capitalist and liberal 
bloc, the expression has a vertiginously upward trend that has been declining 
for some time. 
FIGURE 6 
SOURCE: https://books.google.com/ngrams 
Finally, if the frequency of the use of the expression “social justice” in 
Spanish, English, and French is compared with that of  “distributive justice” 
in the same languages (figures 7, 8, and 9), it can be concluded that the first 
expression has been more popular than the second one starting from the sec-
ond stage, a phenomenon that may be explained by the fact that the ex-
pression “social justice” began to include distributive justice by this time, as 
explained above.99 
FIGURE 7 
SOURCE: https://books.google.com/ngrams 
Supra note 46. 
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FIGURE 8 
SOURCE: https://books.google.com/ngrams 
FIGURE 9 
SOURCE: https://books.google.com/ngrams 
E. Social Justice in Latin American Constitutions 
The first Latin American constitution that used the expression “social jus-
tice” was the Constitution of  Costa Rica in 1949, which followed the typical 
Christian sense of the term in the second stage.100 Nevertheless, the expres-
sion was popularized in the Latin American constitutionalism in the cur-
rent third stage of  its evolution, in which the theological component is not
evident yet.101 
So, the Constitution of Panama enshrined social justice as an element
that the right to education must foster, and as a purpose to be effective by the
State when intervening in enterprises.102 The Constitution of  Cuba decreed
100 Constitución de Costa Rica, 1949, as originally published, art. 74. 
101 Although some researches in the future could go deeper into the influence of the social 
doctrine of  the Catholic Church (even the so-called Liberation Theology) in the development 
of  some constitutions in the region in the seventies and eighties. 
102 Constitución Política de la República de Panamá, 1972, as originally published, art.
87, art. 243. In 1992, the expression was included in the preamble as a purpose of  the State.
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the right to social justice as the purpose of  the republic.103 The Constitution 
of  Honduras stated that the “principles” of  social justice are the founda-
tion of  the economic system and the objective to be guaranteed by the
process of agrarian reform in rural areas.104 The Constitution of  El Salvador 
included social justice as a duty of  the State and a founding principle for 
labor rights, social security, and the economy.105 The Constitution of  Gua-
temala decreed that the labor law and the social and economic orders are 
organized based on the “principles” of  social justice.106 The Constitution of 
Brazil established that the economic order has to guarantee a dignified exis-
tence, according to the principles of  social justice, and that the social order 
(social security and health) must achieve social justice.107 The Constitution 
of  Paraguay enshrined social justice as a purpose that the right to educa-
tion must promote.108 The Constitution of  Argentina ordered the Congress 
to legislate in order to achieve economic development with social justice.109 
The Constitution of  Venezuela decreed social justice as a purpose of the 
State and one of  the principles in which the economic regime is founded.110 
The Constitution of  Ecuador asserted that social justice is the principle in 
which the right to the enjoyment of  city and its public spaces is founded.111 
The Constitution of  Bolivia enshrined social justice as founding purpose of 
the State and as one of  the purposes both of  the State when carrying out its 
functions and the higher education.112 And, recently, the Constitution of  the 
Dominican Republic declared that social justice is a founding element both 
of  the functions of  the State and of  the economic regime.113 
The most important exceptions of  this tendency are Mexico, Chile, Peru, 
and Colombia, which could be studied by future researchers that analyze the 
political, ideological, and legal causes which determined that, in some coun-
tries and not in others, there had been a consensus to expressly constitutional-
ize the term “social justice”. 
103 Constitución de la República de Cuba, 1976, as originally published, art. 1. 
104 Constitución de la República de Honduras, 1982, as originally published, art. 328, art. 
344. 
105 Constitución de la República de El Salvador, 1983, as originally published, art. 1, art. 
52, art. 101. 
106 Constitución Política de la República de Guatemala, 1985, as originally published, art. 
101, art. 118. 
107 Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil, 1988, as originally published, art. 170, 
193. 
108 Constitución de la República de Paraguay, 1992, as originally published, art. 73. 
109 Constitución de la Nación Argentina, 1853, as amended in 1994, art. 75. 
110 Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, 1999, as originally published, 
preamble, art. 299. 
111 Constitución de la República del Ecuador, 2008, as originally published, art. 31. 
112 Constitución del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, 2009, as originally published, art. 
8-II, art.9, art. 91, II. 
113 Constitución Política de la República Dominicana, 2015, as originally published, art. 
8, art. 217. 
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III. SOCIAL JUSTICE IN COLOMBIAN CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE 
The reception of  the notion of  distributive or social justice in an extended 
sense in Colombia can be verified in the debates that led to the enactment of 
the new Constitution in 1991.114 In the Gaceta Constitucional (Constitutional 
Gazette), the official newspaper that published the projects and proposals dis-
cussed in the National Constituent Assembly, it can be seen how the notions 
of human dignity, affirmative actions, and social justice were expressly used 
according to the discourse of  the social stage in an extended sense. Thus, 
some constituents understood social justice as one of  the main purposes of 
the Social Rule of  Law,115 by comparing it with the full warranty of  labor 
rights (both individual and collective), according to its use in the Catholic 
social discourse of  the second stage,116 and by understanding it as an essential 
purpose of  the intervention of  the Social Rule of  Law in the economy.117 One 
year later, the Constitutional Court decided the Judgement T-406 of  1992, in 
which it mentions both social and distributive justice as a matter of  allocation 
of  means with the aim of  guaranteeing social rights in the new Social Rule of 
Law.118 So, it is possible that social justice or distributive justice can be consid-
ered, at least implicitly, as an aspiration of  the Colombia Social Rule of  Law, 
and which, according to the Court’s jurisprudence, has been understood as a 
“constitutional purpose,”119 although it has not been expressly established in 
the Constitution. However, its express establishment as a purpose, a principle, 
or even a constitutional right corresponds to the competence of  the constitu-
ent power, whether original (the people through a National Constituent As-
sembly by drafting a new Constitution) or derivative (the congress through 
an amendment to the Constitution). Nevertheless, the 1991 Constitution en-
shrined the three elements of  social justice described above as will be shown 
in the next three items. 
114 Even though the word “reception” may imply a passive process of  assimilation of  for-
eign legal-political ideas about distributive justice in the country, before adopting another ex-
pression a profound research is necessary to show that there was, at the time, an original local 
or regional understanding of  social justice or modern distributive justice, which is not relevant 
to carry out in this text. 
115 Asamblea Nacional Constituyente [National Constituent Assembly], 6 Gaceta Consti-
tucional 1, 2 (1991). 
116 Asamblea Nacional Constituyente [National Constituent Assembly], 11 Gaceta Con-
stitucional 11 (1991). 
117 Asamblea Nacional Constituyente [National Constituent Assembly], 8 Gaceta Con-
stitucional 2 (1991); Asamblea Nacional Constituyente [National Constituent Assembly], 22 
Gaceta Constitucional 41, 51 (1991). 
118 Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Judgment T-406 of  1992. 
119 See supra note 3. 
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1. Social Justice in the Constitution of  1991 
A. The Principle of  Social Rule of  Law 
Article 1 of  the Constitution describes Colombia as a Social Rule of  Law,120 
whose main purpose is to guarantee some minimum means for the exercise of 
civil and political rights, as discussed earlier. Many books, articles, and judg-
ments have defined this principle enshrined by the Constitution,121 but what 
is important to note here is that, since the beginning, the main interpreter 
the Constitution, the Constitutional Court has pronounced on the essential 
purpose of this kind of state mentioned above, and it has identified it as the 
sense of  social or distributive justice that derives from a Social Rule of  Law 
such as the Colombian one: 
if  it were necessary to give an abstract judgment on distributive justice... one
could resort to the principle of  equality, …from which all distribution of 
means, in order to be just, should, at least, improve the social position of  the
most disadvantaged. In other words, distributive justice must be considered
as a problem of  distribution —of  allocation by the State— of  new means
available, whose final result, whatever the beneficiaries or those affected by
such distribution may be, does not spoil the situation of  those who have fewer 
122means.
In the legal system, evidence of this principle of Social Rule of Law as a 
duty to guarantee some minimum means to allow people exercise their rights 
can be found in the Constitution itself, which has an entire chapter devoted 
to social, economic, and cultural rights,123 and an article on the State inter-
vention in the economy in order to guarantee the fair distribution of  oppor-
120 Constitución Política de Colombia [Const.], as amended, Diario Oficial [D.O.], July 
20, 1991 (Col.), art. 1. 
121 See, e.g., JHEISON TORRES ÁVILA, EL MANDATO DEL ESTADO SOCIAL DE DERECHO EN LA
CONSTITUCIÓN COLOMBIANA (Bogotá: Universidad Santo Tomás, 2012); Luis Villar Borda, Es-
tado de derecho y Estado social de derecho, 20 REVISTA DERECHO DEL ESTADO 73 (2005). 
122 Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Judgment T-406 of 1992. In 
Spanish: “Si fuese necesario dar elementos de juicio en abstracto sobre la justicia distribu-
tiva… se podría recurrir al principio de igualdad, …a partir del cual toda distribución de 
recursos, para ser justa, deba mejorar al menos la condición de los más desfavorecidos. Dicho 
en otra perspectiva, la justicia distributiva debe ser planteada como un problema de repar-
tición —de asignación por parte del Estado— de recursos nuevos disponibles, cuyo resultado 
final, cualesquiera que sean los beneficiarios o los afectados por tal repartición, no desmejore 
la situación de aquellos que poseen menos recursos.” 
123 Constitución Política de Colombia [Const.], as amended, Diario Oficial [D.O.], July, 
20 1991 (Col.), title 2, chap. 2. 
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tunities and other objectives,124 and in other norms such as the acts on social 
security,125 higher education,126 etc. 
B. The Principle of  Human Dignity 
Article 1 of  the Colombian Constitution enshrines the principle of  human 
dignity as a founder principle of  the Social Rule of  Law. This precept is not 
a mere aspiration of the constituent or a symbolic text, but a binding legal 
rule.127 In several judgments, the Court has emphasized human dignity as 
a fundamental principle and right of  the Constitution and the Social Rule 
of  Law; human dignity is an inherent attribute of  the human beings, which 
makes them the creditors of  minimum rights in order to guarantee their de-
velopment in the best conditions.128 
Furthermore, this principle is i) a mandatory hermeneutical directive for 
all public authorities, ii) an absolute a priori principle, that is, it cannot be 
limited or downplayed, like other principles and rights;129 and iii) a direct nor-
mative source of  fundamental rights both enshrined in the Constitution and 
non-enshrined expressly.130 It is important to clarify here that fundamental 
rights are also understood as the economic, social, and cultural rights recog-
nized by the constitutional jurisprudence, such as the right to health and to a 
vital minimum, because of  their deep and indissoluble connection with the 
human dignity itself.131 
An example of  the scope of  human dignity is the Judgment C-177 of 
2001,132 in which the Court established a public lawsuit of  unconstitutionality 
against a part of  article 322A of  the Criminal Code, which enshrined that the 
124 Id. at art. 334. 
125 Ley 100 de 1993 por la cual se crea el sistema de seguridad social integral y se dictan 
otras disposiciones [Act 100 of  1993 by which it is created the integral social security system 
and other issues are enacted], as amended, Diario Oficial [D.O.], December 23, 1993 (Col.). 
126 Ley 30 de 1992 por la cual se organiza el servicio público de la educación superior 
[Act 30 of  1992 by which it is organized the public service of  higher education], as amended, 
Diario Oficial [D.O.], December 29,1992 (Col.). 
127 Constitución Política de Colombia [Const.], as amended, Diario Oficial [D.O.], July 
20, 1991 (Col.), art. 4. 
128 RODOLFO ARANGO, EL CONCEPTO DE DERECHOS SOCIALES FUNDAMENTALES 289, 290 (Bo-
gotá: Legis, 2012). 
129 Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Judgment T-401 of  1992. 
130 Constitución Política de Colombia [Const.], as amended, Diario Oficial [D.O.], July, 
20, 1991 (Col.), arts. 1, 5, 94. 
131 BERNARDO CARVAJAL-SÁNCHEZ, EL PRINCIPIO DE DIGNIDAD HUMANA EN LA JURISPRUDENCIA
CONSTITUCIONAL COLOMBIANA Y FRANCESA 27-35, 40-47 (Bogotá: Universidad Externado de 
Colombia, 2005). 
132 Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Judgment C-177 of  2001. 
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crime of  genocide did not protect illegal groups, e.g., guerrillas. The Court 
declared the unconstitutionality of  that part of  the rule, motivated by the fact 
that it was against human dignity because it set up a limitation to the inalien-
able rights that every person has by virtue of  being human,133 which cannot 
be restricted even if  the acts of  the persons involved are outside the Law; i.e., 
everybody has some inalienable rights based on their human dignity, which 
must be guaranteed regardless of  their degree of  contribution to the common 
good or, “emulating” the Court, “regardless of  whether they deserve those 
rights or privileges”. 
C. The Right to Material Equality 
As a development of  the principles of human dignity and solidarity,134 
article 13 enshrines the right to “material equality”.135 This expression has
been frequently used by the Constitutional Court in its judgments since 1992
when it refers to the right that every Colombian has to demand from the
State affirmative actions to overcome socio-economic inequalities of the poor-
est, vulnerable, and traditionally discriminated or marginalized sectors of  so-
ciety.136 
In fact, most of  the Court’s judgments on social rights in the last two 
decades grant the protection of  the right to health when the Health Care 
Service Providers (Entidades Promotoras de Salud) do not guarantee the right to 
health service access to the plaintiffs, especially when they have low economic 
means, poor means of  subsistence, or are subjects with a special status in the 
Constitution (children, pregnant women, old men or women, etc.). This is a 
clear accomplishment of  the fundamental right to material equality in Article 
13: the State must guarantee the right to real and effective equality of oppor-
tunities in the protection of rights and access to offices, especially if they are 
subjects in conditions of  vulnerability. 
2. Unveiling Constitutional Meaning of  Social Justice 
So, the modern notion of  distributive justice or social justice and not the
ancient or Aristotelian one is an implicit idea in the Constitution, because
the latter enshrined the three main elements of  such a modern notion, i.e.,
133 Constitución Política de Colombia [Const.], as amended, Diario Oficial [D.O.], July 
20, 1991 (Col.), arts. 1, 5. 
134 Constitución Política de Colombia [Const.], as amended, Diario Oficial [D.O.], July, 
20,1991 (Col.), art. 1. 
135 Constitución Política de Colombia [Const.], as amended, Diario Oficial [D.O.], July 
20, 1991 (Col.), art. 13. 
136 See, e.g., Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Judgment C-177 of  2016. 
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the principles of  Social Rule of  Law and human dignity, and the right to
material equality, which were available in the global and national constitu-
tional discourse of  the years in which the Constitution was enacted. This
exercise allows to construct a notion of  distributive justice that, contrary
to the Aristotelian one, is in accordance with the Constitution and can be
applied by all public authorities, not only the Court, and citizens when they
are asked how social justice should be understood in the Colombian consti-
tutional discourse. It is not intended to give an incontrovertible definition,
but rather to present a concept that can be used to i) clarify a diffuse notion
in the Colombian legal system, ii) interpret and apply it more consistently with
the Constitution, and iii) generate an intense debate about the notion itself 
(both in scholarly circles and in those sectors that have the power to make the
Law). Recently, for example, the same Constitutional Court has brought to
the Colombian constitutional debate the concern for an “environmental jus-
tice,” thus complementing the anthropocentric approach to distributive justice
by ruling that the use of  natural resources must be made in a sustainable way,
ensuring that their exploitation generates the least negative environmental
impact so that both present and future generations can enjoy the environ-
ment on equal opportunities.137 However, the fulfillment of environmental
justice requires the concomitant materialization of  distributive justice, which
is one more reason why all the legal agents in the Colombian legal system
are sure about the essential meaning that the expression social or distributive
justice must have if  it is going to be used in the Colombian constitutional
discourse. 
Thus, all public authorities and citizens are called to understand, inter-
pret, and apply the constitutional distributive justice in the Colombian con-
stitutional discourse, at least, as follows: the social justice of  the Colombian
Social Rule of  Law is a duty of the State to guarantee or allocate everyone,
by virtue of their human dignity, some minimum means so that they can ex-
ercise all their rights and fulfill their life plan, and a material equality through 
the application of affirmative actions, which consist of a distribution of rights
in equal opportunity and always for the benefit of the most disadvantaged in
the society, that is, the poor, the vulnerable, the discriminated, and the mar-
ginalized. 
The above definition shows that, in the current constitutional order, it is 
not congruent to turn to Aristotle, for example, to define the meaning of so-
cial justice in the constitutional discourse, and that the demonstration of  the 
implicit presence of  a modern notion of  distributive justice in the Constitu-
tion is a more complex exercise than the simple textual comparison between 
John Rawls’ principles of  justice (from which modern debates on distributive 
justice start)138 and the constitutional text, as some scholars have already stat-
137 Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Judgment T-294 of  2014. 
138 RAWLS, A THEORY, supra note 81. 
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ed.139 Also, it is important to emphasize that any approximation to the mean-
ing of  distributive justice in the Colombian constitutional discourse cannot 
be understood only from a single discipline (e.g., political philosophy) or from 
a single group of  “fashion authors” —which, ultimately, are the product of 
their own historical context— (John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas, etc.),140 be-
cause such exercise needs i) the comparative historical contextualization of 
the received discourses about social or distributive justice in Colombia, and, 
of  course, ii) the analysis on the presence of  their essential elements in the 
Constitution, as this paper has attempted to make. 
Now, the question about the minimum means of social justice is an issue 
that contemporary political philosophy is currently debating, for example, 
from the Rawls’ approach on primary goods,141 the alternative approach 
centered on capacities formulated by Amartya Sen,142 and the ideas about 
material contents of  distributive justice demanded at the international lev-
el.143 However, the answer to the Colombian constitutional case should not 
only be based on these theoretical references, since, above all, a “list” of  vital 
minimum means guaranteed by the Social Rule of  Law must be the result of 
the political struggle for its recognition by the Colombian society, in arenas 
such as the legislative and the executive branches of  power, according to the 
need to resolve the problems that the society itself  has and without depend-
ing on a decontextualized theory that ordains the explicit content of  such 
a “list”, allowing, in turn, a strengthening of  participatory democracy that 
counterbalances the Court’s marked judicialization of  politics in deciding the 
content, scope, and enforceability of  social rights, without depriving it from 
this function. 
Furthermore, it is important to clarify that, although many of the compo-
nents of  this notion of  social justice have some antecedents in the Catholic 
Church’s tradition of  thought, this does not imply that the interpretation of 
these components must be done based on this religion. Nor does it mean 
that the components should be rejected because of  their origin, despite their 
potential to materialize the Social Rule of Law, which is achieved if they are 
interpreted and contextualized within the framework of  the Constitution. 
So, it can be said that, as social justice or modern distributive justice is 
implicitly contained in the Colombian constitutional law, it is not an extra-
systemic element neither an absolute idea, because, although it is not estab-
139 RICARDO SOTAQUIRÁ-GUTIERREZ, Justicia distributiva y problematización de la desigualdad en el 
discurso constitucional colombiano, 7 REFLEXIÓN POLÍTICA, 13, 154 (2005). 
140 Cf. OSCAR MEJÍA QUINTANA, TEORÍA CONSENSUAL DEL DERECHO. EL DERECHO COMO
DELIBERACIÓN PÚBLICA (Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2016). 
141 RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 88 at 168-176. 
142 AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009). 
143 ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: MORAL FOUNDATIONS
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 191-230 (Oxford, 2004). 
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lished by a specific rule, its components are Constitutional rules of manda-
tory compliance.144 Actually, the same exercise can be done in other countries 
which have no purpose or principle of  social justice in their constitutions such 
as Mexico or Chile, in order to identify both i) its implicit presence through 
the enshrinement in their constitutions of  the three main elements of  social 
justice in the transnational constitutional discourse, and ii) the legal mecha-
nisms to materialize social justice. 
3. The Exceptional Presence of  the Aristotelian Distributive Justice 
The jurisprudence of  the Constitutional Court has understood distributive 
justice, in most of its trials in which it has tried to define it, according to its 
modern sense. Nevertheless, there are some judgments where the Court has 
used a very unusual mixture of  the corrective justice in an Aristotelian sense 
and the distributive justice based on merit (i.e. the amount of  contributions 
to the common good, the Court’s definition of  merit). 
In Colombia, there are no scholarly works about the presence of the Ar-
istotelian notion of  distributive justice in the jurisprudence of  the Constitu-
tional Court. For instance, Alejandro Matta, in his paper on the influence of 
Aristotle in the Court’s judgments, only briefly analyzes the value of justice 
for Aristotle, by saying that his ideas have been followed by the Court in some 
judgments as a tool aimed to overcome a norm-centered hermeneutic, but he 
doesn’t identify how the main features of  the Aristotelian notion of  distribu-
tive justice has been applied in its jurisprudence.145 
The methodology used to select the “Aristotelian” judgments was as fol-
lows: first, on the Court’s web page, all judgments which contain the expres-
sion “distributive justice” were searched; then, those judgments which define 
the distributive justice were selected; after that, each one was studied with 
the aim to determine the sense of  distributive justice contained in them, i.e., 
an Aristotelian or modern sense. Finally, these cases were classified by year 
and their category of  distributive justice, and were organized in the following 
table. The “Aristotelian” judgments are marked with an asterisk. 
144 Whatever the meaning of  social justice may be in a determined legal system of  a soci-
ety, it is not an absolute one because it depends on its background and its evolution conducted 
by the legal agents; comp. HANS KELSEN, WHAT IS JUSTICE? 1-24 (Berkeley: University of  Cali-
fornia Press, 1971). Even though Kelsen talks about a personal notion of  justice, the essential 
message is clear: it has no absolute meaning, but a relative one. 
145 ALEJANDRO MATTA, Aproximación a la metaética de la Corte Constitucional Colombiana: influencia 
de la filosofía práctica de corte aristotélico en su jurisprudencia constitucional, 38 PENSAMIENTO JURÍDICO
31 (2013). 
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TABLE 1 
COLOMBIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT’S JUDGMENTS SINCE 1992 TO 2016 
CONTAINING AND DEFINING THE EXPRESSION “DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE” 
SOURCE: http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co 
According to the results of  this research, two issues can be concluded: the 
first one is that there are five judgments in which the Aristotelian notion of  
distributive justice is used to base the decision: C-171 of  1993, C-069 of  1994, 
C-762 of  2002, C-073 of  2010, and T-271 of  2014; Judgment C-171 of  
1993 is the founder of  the “Aristotelian precedent” because it was quoted 
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by the other ones. The second one is that, as there have been no changes 
in the Aristotelian definition of distributive justice in Judgment C-171 of 
1993 throughout the years, this judgment will be studied alone in order to 
extract the Court’s Aristotelian notion of  distributive justice. This herme-
neutic methodology is known in Colombian legal academy as the static jur-
isprudential analysis (análisis jurisprudencial estático), as opposed to the dynamic 
jurisprudential analysis (análisis jurisprudencial dinámico), which consists of  the 
interpretation of  an individual judgment, not several ones over the years.146 
Thus, Judgment C-171 of  1993 by Justice Vladimiro Naranjo Mesa de-
cided the constitutionality of Decree 264 of 1993,147 which was enacted in 
the frame of  an State of  exception by internal shock (Estado de excepción por 
conmoción interior), declared on November 3th, 1993, with the aim of fighting 
criminality through the implementation of  some mechanisms that allowed 
the Attorney General to get from the defendants and convicts a greater col-
laboration with the State in the prosecution and punishment of  the crimes 
related to drug growth, funding, traffic, elaboration, and promotion, the ob-
struction of  justice by public authorities, terrorism, and those crimes against 
the security and existence of  the State itself  (e.g., espionage) and against the 
valid constitutional regime (e.g., rebellion and sedition). The mechanisms that 
this Decree gave to the Attorney General were benefits to the collaborator 
such as house arrest, partial or general pardon, among others. 
At least two legal problems were considered by the Court: the first was 
whether this Decree had violated the constitutional prohibition to modify the 
judicial accusation and judgment functions through a State of  exception.148 
The second one was whether the Decree had broken the right to equality by 
giving certain benefits only to some criminals and not to all of them. The 
Court’s decision to the first problem was that the executive modified the accu-
sation and judgment functions because it was giving judicial functions to the 
Attorney General and also congressional functions such as general pardons, 
which are only granted in cases of political crimes. On the second problem, 
the Court said that the Decree made an unjustified distinction between the 
beneficiaries and the rest of criminals, even though the formers had commit-
ted the worst crimes according to the Criminal Code. 
According to the Court, the constitutional right to equality was violated 
by the Decree because “it gave a more favorable treatment to certain type of 
criminals, paradoxically …to those who [had] committed the worst crimes 
against society, including crimes against humanity, such as indiscriminate acts 
of  terrorism. There is, in this case, an evident breaking of  the principle of 
146 DIEGO LÓPEZ-MEDINA, EL DERECHO DE LOS JUECES 193-264 (Bogotá: Legis, 2006).
147 Decreto 264 de 1993 por el cual se expiden normas sobre concesión de beneficios por 
colaboración con la justicia [Decree 264 of  1993 by which some rules on the granting of  ben-
efits for collaboration with justice are enacted], Diario Oficial [D.O.], February 5, 1993 (Col.). 
148 Constitución Política de Colombia [Const.], as amended, Diario Oficial [D.O.], July 
20, 1991 (Col.), art. 252. 
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distributive justice and commutative justice.”149 Then, the Court defined the 
sense of  distributive justice to adjudicate this case: “in the distributive justice, 
it is observed the mean according to the merit of  the people. But that merit is 
also observed in the commutative justice, for example in the allocation of pun-
ishments, because the punishment will be higher to that person who affects 
seriously the common good. As said before, the distributive justice allocates 
something among people, according to the personal merit of  each one. So, a 
benefit cannot be granted only according to the thing exclusively, but accord-
ing to the proportion of  the thing with respect to the person.”150 Now, on the 
meaning of  merit, the Court said: “the more a person contributes through his 
daily actions to the common good, the greater the prerogatives must be. That 
is to say, the objective contribution to the common good and the consistent ac-
tion with the general interest must be taken into account in order to apply the 
principle of  equality, which corresponds not to quantity but to proportion.”151 
Then the Court explained that distributive justice could tolerate difference or 
inequality, except in cases where it is contrary to the proportional distribution 
of merit; the Court said that “granting some citizens a series of benefits..., 
excluding the other individuals from those exceptional privileges, means es-
tablishing the principle known as the “people differentiation” opposed to the 
equality proper to justice. In fact, the above-mentioned anti-juridical saying 
contradicts distributive justice since it consists of  allocating the goods and the 
penalties to different people in proportion to their merit. Consequently, when 
one considers this property of  the human being, by which he is given what is 
due to him, his individuality is not observed as much as his merit or dignity. 
Therefore, it is clear that the differentiation of people is opposed to justice, 
since adjudicating without proportion is not equal. And nothing is as much 
opposed to justice as inequality.”152 In this way, the Court emphasizes that, 
149 Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Judgment C-171 of  1993. In Span-
ish: “al darle un trato más favorable a cierto tipo de delincuentes, paradójicamente …a quienes
[habían] incurrido en los peores crímenes que puedan cometerse contra la sociedad, incluyen-
do delitos de lesa humanidad, como son los atentados terroristas indiscriminados. Existe en ello
un evidente quebrantamiento del principio de justicia distributiva y de justicia conmutativa.” 
150 Id. In Spanish: “En la justicia distributiva se observa el medio de acuerdo con el mereci-
miento de las personas. Pero ese merecimiento también se observa en la justicia conmutativa, 
como por ejemplo en la imposición de penas, pues será mayor el castigo a quien afecte grave-
mente el bien común. Como se ha venido sosteniendo, la justicia distributiva adjudica algo 
entre los particulares, según el merecimiento personal de cada uno de éstos. Por tanto, no se 
puede conceder un beneficio según la cosa en sí —exclusivamente—, sino según la proporción 
que guardan dichas cosas con las personas.” 
151 Id. In Spanish: “Entre más participa la persona por medio de sus actos cotidianos al 
bien común, mayores deben ser las prerrogativas. Es decir, debe tenerse en cuenta el aporte 
objetivo al bien común y una actuación coherente con el interés general, para así aplicar el 
principio de igualdad donde éste corresponde no a la cantidad sino a la proporción.” 
152 Id. In Spanish: “concederles a algunos ciudadanos una serie de beneficios…, excluyendo
de esos privilegios excepcionales a los demás individuos, significa establecer el principio cono-
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when it comes to adjudicating on distributive justice in a case, that is, allocat-
ing both property and penalties, merit is a substantial element and cannot be 
negotiated.153 The Court declared that the Decree contradicted the right to 
equality because it enshrined punitive privileges to a group of  criminals —es-
pecially those who deserved it less— and denied them to the rest criminals.154 
The question that arises now is: where did the Court get the concept of 
distributive justice from? This is not an innocuous issue because the decision 
on the unconstitutionality of  the Decree depends on the adopted concept of 
distributive justice. In fact, in the other three judgments of  constitutionality, 
the Court decided a similar issue, i.e., the unconstitutionality of  a criminal 
act in which special benefits were given to criminals because their lesser con-
tribution to the common good made them less deserving to those punitive 
benefits. And, in the most recent judgment, the Court denied a request for 
house arrest made by a prisoner with HIV due to his illness, and it founded its 
arguments also in the lack of merit of the prisoner to such a punitive benefit, 
even though, because of  his vulnerable condition, it could be argued that 
his stay in prison was against his human dignity.155 Anyway, what is clear at 
first glance is that, in these five judgments, the Court follows the well-known 
“meaning” of  justice: “justice is to give each one what they deserve”, i.e., the 
Aristotelian or ancient sense of  distributive justice. 
cido como la “acepción de personas”, opuesto a la igualdad propia de la justicia. En efecto, la
máxima antijurídica a que se ha hecho mención contradice a la justicia distributiva; pues ésta
consiste en distribuir los bienes y las penas a las distintas personas en proporción a su mereci-
miento. En consecuencia, cuando se considera dicha propiedad del ser humano, por la cual se le
da lo que le es debido, no se observa tanto su individualidad como su merecimiento o dignidad.
Por tanto, es evidente que la acepción de personas se opone a la justicia, puesto que al obrar sin
proporción desconoce la igualdad. Y nada se opone tanto a la justicia como la desigualdad.” 
153 Therefore, the distribution of the benefit of a total punitive pardon to defendants and 
convicts of  the crimes mentioned above clashes with equality because —through their ac-
tions— they have not contributed to a large extent to the common good and, therefore, have 
no personal merit proportional to the purpose of  such forgiveness, which is to reward people 
who —in spite of  their transgressive acts— have contributed the most to the common good; 
so, as these crimes affect the most the public order, according to the Court’s opinion, the dam-
age to the common good is greater than the benefits that an effective collaboration of these 
criminals can bring to justice. 
154 In his way, the Court, as part of the notion of distributive justice, justified inequali-
ties among persons according to their merit, without taking into account the justification of 
inequalities according to the disadvantaged position in society, a fundamental element in the 
modern debate on distributive justice. In fact, the Court explained that differences with respect 
to merit could be justified on the grounds that persons who are convicted of less heinous crimes 
than those convicted by the most atrocious crimes are “more deserving”; otherwise, it would be 
like treating equally persons who have different merits. 
155 In fact, in a dissenting opinion, Justice Jorge Iván Palacios said that the act prohibiting 
house arrest for anyone convicted because of the crimes such as those of the plaintiff, ought 
not to be applied in this case because it could not fully guarantee his right to life. 
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However, the Court has mixed the two types of  particular Aristotelian jus-
tice, in what has been called here an “Aristotelian and corrective distributive 
justice”. Indeed, to the Court, distributive justice consists of  the distribution 
of goods and penalties and is based on merit, thus falling into a substantial 
theoretical imprecision because the penalties, according to Aristotle, cannot 
be allocated depending on merit, because it is intended to correct the inequal-
ity caused by an anti-legal damage. Thus, the Court has based the unconstitu-
tionality of  the Decree in this judgment, and in the others that followed it as 
a precedent, on a wrong interpretation of  the Aristotelian theory of  justice, 
although it does not mean that the applied notion of  distributive justice lacks 
Aristotelian roots. Then, by applying such an Aristotelian and corrective no-
tion of  distributive justice, the Court violates the principle of  Social Rule of 
Law because that notion does not take into account the concern of  ensuring 
everyone a minimum quantity of means to fulfill their life plan, which is the 
base of  one of  the essential objectives of  the State itself. 
Also, as it can be seen, there is also no coherence between the Court’s no-
tion of  distributive justice based on merit, according to which a person will 
be entitled rights and benefits from the society depending on the quantity 
of  his contribution to the common good, and the principle of  human dig-
nity, which, applied to the idea of  distributive justice, means that everyone 
can be a subject of  distributive justice just for the fact of  being human and, 
therefore, everyone has an equal dignity to participate in the distribution of 
rights available in society without relying on the merit as the quantity of  their 
contribution to the common good. Thus, by interpreting distributive justice 
based on the Aristotelian merit, the Court violates the principle of  human 
dignity and questions its absolute character because it says that it does not 
matter if all human beings have the same dignity to participate in the distri-
bution of social goods, because there are always some people more dignified 
than others, that is, there are people who deserve more than others to be 
treated in a privileged way by the Law and the State. 
Additionally, there is no coherence between adopting the Aristotelian notion
of  distributive justice —which allows socio-economic inequalities as long as
equality in merit is not affected, because the most important is that there be no
inequalities in merit— and the obligation imposed by the Constitution to guar-
antee a different treatment in benefit of the least favored in society in order to
realize an effective and real equality with the same opportunities for everyone,
which is the conceptualization of  the fundamental right to material equality. 
Thus, according to the methodology of jurisprudential analysis proposed 
by the Critical Legal Studies,156 such notion of  distributive justice applied in 
this judgment allows to identify that the ideology on which Justice Vladimiro 
Naranjo decided this case is framed into the Natural Law, specifically in the 
DUNCAN KENNEDY, LIBERTAD Y RESTRICCIÓN EN LA DECISIÓN JUDICIAL (Bogotá: Universi-
dad de los Andes, 1999). 
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Aristotelian-Thomist tradition. In the Middle Ages, Thomas Aquinas, by in-
troducing Aristotle into the European political philosophy, conditioned the 
interpretation of  the former in the centuries to come, which can be seen in 
Judgment C-171 of 1993 both in the permanence of the use of the adjective 
“commutative” when describing Aristotelian corrective justice, and in the ad-
dition of  “the achievement of  the common good” as a goal of  distributive 
justice and corrective justice,157 something that is not originally expressed in 
Aristotle’s theory of  justice, since he only referred to that goal as a charac-
teristic of  a good constitution or form of  government.158 Justice Naranjo’s 
Aristotelian-Thomist ideology has also been noticed by professor Cristina 
Motta who has shown, in his judgments, the recurring use of  the “common 
good” as an axiological category by which Law and justice in the Colombian 
Social Rule of  Law should be guided.159 Also, it is important to note that, 
recently, the Court has revived the debate on the validity of Natural Law 
in the Colombian Social Rule of  Law by declaring constitutional the use of 
“the principles of  Natural Law” to interpret the Constitution in penumbra 
cases, against what was requested in an unconstitutionality action that sought 
to repeal this possibility enshrined in an article of  the centennial Civil Code. 
However, currently, it is difficult to predict the use and effects that this judg-
ment can have in the long term.160 
Finally, it must be said that, although the Court would not have modi-
fied the declaration of unenforceability of Decree 264 in Judgment C-171 of 
1993, even if  a modern notion of  distributive justice had been applied, since 
there was another reason to declare it unconstitutional as explained in the first 
chapter, it is important to mention that a correct interpretation in that judg-
ment regarding distributive justice would have allowed a better protection of 
rights, since: i) the type of justice applicable to the case was corrective, not 
distributive; ii) corrective justice is not based on merit, but on the restoration 
of  broken equality, therefore, the Court violated human dignity by consider-
ing a group of people less deserving to receive the benefits of the Decree; iii)
the majority of  the justices did not understand that, in this case, there was no 
discrimination between the defendants/condemned who profited from the 
Decree and those who did not, since, precisely, the State of  exception was an 
exceptional situation in which the measures to be taken to stop violence had 
to be different to those envisaged in ordinary situations; and iv) a rule with 
a constitutional legitimate purpose was drawn from the legal system, even 
157 JORGE MARTÍNEZ, Santo Tomás de Aquino y la teoría de la justicia, 12, DERECHO Y HUMANI-
DADES, 109 (2006). 
158 ARISTOTLE, P., supra note 28 at 1279a8-1283b27. 
159 CRISTINA MOTTA, ÉTICA Y CONFLICTO 226-229 (Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes 1995). 
160 Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Judgment C-284 of  2015. In opin-
ion of the author (who also was the plaintiff in this judgment), it is curious to see how the 
drafter Justice studied his LL.B. at the same university where Justice Vladimiro Narajo Mesa 
studied (Universidad del Rosario). 
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though it aimed to achieve peace and, through it, to guarantee the validity of 
all those purposes, principles, and rights of  the Social Rule of  Law limited by 
a war.161 Thus, an analysis such as that of  the Court in this Judgment C-171 
of 1993 and the other five, would mean now, for example, that it is legitimate 
to deny members of  the FARC-EP and ELN guerrillas exceptional benefits for 
making peace, with the argument that they are persons who do not deserve 
them because of  their low level of  contribution to the common good and that 
the same treatment should be given to the other offenders, just as proposed 
by the Court in the judgments discussed here. 
4. Achieving Social Justice Through Law 
The application of  this modern notion of  distributive justice or social jus-
tice, based on the principles and the right mentioned above, can serve to 
empower the Constitutional Court, other authorities of  the public power, 
and the rest of  Colombians, to materialize the aspirations of  the Social Rule 
of  Law itself. In fact, the Court has already implicitly applied this notion of 
distributive justice to defense and has extended the social rights initially en-
shrined by the Constitution, thus guaranteeing its validity as full rights.162 
Thus, both the Court and other public authorities can continue or, if  they 
have not done it yet, begin to materialize the Social Rule of  Law, by applying 
the notion of  social justice proposed here, either i) in cases among individu-
als, in which the persons or groups may be in a condition of vulnerability or 
marginality (the displaced before the measures of  eviction without alterna-
tives of  relocation by the public administration, the child or elder before the 
adult, the woman before the man, the afro-descendants or indigenous people 
before the whites or mestizos, the homosexual before the heterosexual, etc.), 
ii) in cases where the other branches and agencies of  the public power try 
to restrict the progression of  social rights, for example, by implementing a 
specific economic model that is not in accordance with the distributive justice 
of  the Social Rule of  Law, or iii) when making an act, e.g., by enacting a tax 
reform on income with a progressive tax that allows a redistribution of  wealth 
to social programs that promote the general welfare, especially of  the poorest, 
one of the verifiable achievements of the Social Rule of Law in the last cen-
tury to overcome inequality, and from which very relevant lessons for today 
can be drawn.163 Finally, by knowing the meaning of  social justice and what 
161 These arguments would be shared by the two justices who presented dissenting opin-
ions in Judgment C-171 of  1993. 
162 See, e.g., the judgments of  the Table 1. See also, Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Consti-
tutional Court], Judgment C-209 of  2016; VÍCTOR ABRAMOVICH & CHRISTIAN COURTIS, LOS
DERECHOS SOCIALES COMO DERECHOS EXIGIBLES 37-47 (Madrid: Trotta, 2002). 
163 MARQUARDT, HISTORIA, supra note 56 at 291-296; THOMAS PIKETTY, EL CAPITAL EN EL
SIGLO XXI 525-528 (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2014). 
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is necessary in order to achieve it through Law, individuals and civil society 
in general can use legal arguments to demand the State a broader guaranty 
of  their constitutional rights, without forgetting that they are also responsible 
for the materialization of  the same justice, e.g., through the respect for the 
human dignity of  their peers, the elimination of  behaviors that encourage 
discrimination and marginality, the execution of  practices to increase the ef-
ficient expense of the limited resources that the State assigns to the fulfillment 
of  social rights without corruption, among other aspects. 
So, it is clear that also in the family, the school, the university, the political 
arena, the policy making, etc., it is necessary to promote the constitutional 
meaning of social justice and to avoid using the common idea that social or 
distributive justice is “to give each one what they deserve”, an idea of  a slave 
and a non-egalitarian society in which Aristotle lived, that does not materi-
alize the purposes, principles, and rights that govern the Colombian Social 
Rule of  Law. 
Finally, it is important to point out that, currently in Colombia, many peo-
ple in academia, in politics, and also in the media are talking about the need 
to materialize social justice as the requirement for a stable and lasting peace 
in the country. For example, as mentioned before, the former guerrilla FARC-
EP is very committed with social justice as its slogan in the coming years as a 
Marxist or communist party. Nevertheless, social justice must not be demon-
ized by the FARC-EP’s opponents and ultra-right parties as an expression that 
summarizes a supposed “Castro-chavista political program” for Colombia by 
the possible FARC-EP political party in the post-conflict. In any case, the mate-
rialization of  social justice requires a balance among the principles of  Social 
Rule of Law and human dignity, and the right to material equality, and there 
is no excuse to favor, for example, the realization of  material equality if  the 
principle of  human dignity is violated. So, social justice is not an expression 
neither of  the domain of  Marxists or communists,164 left-wing supporters, nor 
of  the conservative religious sectors, but of  all the persons who believe that 
material equality can be achieved without sacrificing the Rule of Law and 
human dignity in all its forms.165 
164 Actually, Karl Marx himself  never based his ideas on the purpose of  achieving justice 
or “social justice” in its current popular meaning of  the third stage. 
165 As seen, according to its constitution, the Cuban communist regime aims to achieve 
social justice as its main purpose. Nevertheless, this paper argues that this is not possible if  it 
violates human dignity with the excuse of  providing a full material equality; the same observa-
tion can be applied currently in the case of  Venezuela. It is necessary to remember that social
justice is, in fact, a third way to communism and savage capitalism, so civil society must avoid
misunderstanding that social justice is the ultimate political purpose of  communism, because 
communism violates the principle of  human dignity by the strong limitation of  rights such as
freedom of  speech, freedom of enterprise, freedom of  association, freedom of  expression, pri-
vate property, among many others, i.e., by making the human being an instrument of  the State.
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Summarizing, even though social justice is not a purpose or principle en-
shrined by the Constitution, it is an implicit idea in the Constitution because 
it enshrined its three main elements which were available in the global con-
stitutional discourse of  the years in which the Constitution was promulgated, 
i.e., the principles of  Social Rule of  Law and human dignity, and the right 
to material equality. Thus, social justice is a duty of the State to guarantee a 
certain minimum means, based on human dignity and a different treatment 
in benefit of the poorest, discriminated, vulnerable, and marginalized people 
in society. In contrast, an Aristotelian interpretation of  distributive or social 
would disregard, even violate, the two principles and the right mentioned 
above. That is why the achievement of  social justice in the Colombian State 
requires, essentially, the fulfilment of the principles of Social Rule of Law and 
human dignity, and the right to material equality, which are mandatory rules 
to the branches of  power and the civil society. However, this does not mean 
that the meaning of  social justice is static; on the contrary, it is necessary that 
progress be made to complement it with new characteristics and spheres of 
protection (e.g., the sphere of  environmental justice). 
A final reflection that can be mentioned is that this article, even though 
it was not among its objectives, demonstrated the lack of  academic research 
that shows the ways in which social or distributive justice has been interpreted 
in both Colombia and Latin America throughout their history, and the effects 
it has had on the construction of  constitutionalism in the region, among other 
phenomena. The history of the influence of classical or socio legal thinking 
on the configuration of Law in Latin America has been told in extenso, for in-
stance, but not the history of  how elites’ conceptions on the meaning of  social 
or distributive justice have influenced the way in which institutions, relations 
between the people and the State, economic and public policy, etc., have been 
constructed, which would allow us to discover, from another angle, the causes 
of  some current problems in the region in order to generate some contextu-
alized proposals and, perhaps, use others to solve them without resorting to 
the application of  “fashion theories” on social or distributive justice, which, 
by the way, may be loaded with a political content that favors, consciously or 
unconsciously for their own benefit, the worldview and the interests of the 
countries in which they are produced. Thus, narrating the history of  social 
or distributive justice in Colombia and Latin America with such a purpose is 
a pending task. 
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